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(1] Husband and Wife -Propert)o Settlement Alreemen.ts. -A property settlement agreement between husband and wife is valid and binding on the court where it is not tainted by fraud or compulsion or is not in violation of the eoDftdential relationship of the parties.
[2] Id.-PropertJ' Settlement Agreementa.-A property settlement agreement containing support and maintenanee provisions iD the nature of alimony is enforceable, if equitable, even though not presented to the court in a divorce action.
[8] Divorce -Permanent AlimoIlJ-!rIodiflcation-Acreement of Parties as A1fectiDg. -Where a property settlement agreement containing support and maintenance provisions iD the nature of alimony is presented to the court in a divorce action, the court haa the power to modify the provisions of alimony before or, if the provisions are incorporated in the decree, after judgment in accord with its power over alimony generally. l4] Id.-Disposition of PropertJ'-Decree-Modiflcation.-A property settlement agreement containing support and maintenanee provisions, not in the nature of alimony but as part of the division of property, is binding on the court in the abaenee of fraud or a violation of the eoDftdential relationship, and after decree there can be no modilleation of the payments without the consent of the parties.
[6&, lib] Icl. '!'RAYNOR, J.-Defendant appeals from aninterlocutory judgment of divorce providing for support and maintenance of plaintiff until further order of the court.
PlaintDf and defendant separated. One month later they executed a "Property Settlement Agreement" providing for the division of all their property and for the support and maintenance of plaintiff and . their minor child. Support and maintenance were to cease for plaintUf after 18 months but were to continue thereafter for the child. The agreement stated that plaintiff, "in view of her akill and training 88 an. experienced secretary, and by reason of her ability to become gainfully employed, particularly waives any right to support and maintenance other than, or in addition to, that provided herein in view of the premiSes and in consideration of [defendant's] 
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Several months after the execution of this agreement, plaintiff sued for divorce on the ground of cruelty. She prayed for custody of the child, support and maintenance as set out in the agreement, approval of the property settlement agreement, and such other equitable relief as the court deemed just. At the trial of the action, which was uncontested, plaintiff stated that she had received her share of the property under the agreement, as well as payments of support and maintenance, and that the agreement was acceptable to her. In reply to questions by the court, she revealed that she was not employed at the time of the trial and that her husband earned "around $400.00 a month." The court then declared, "Call your next witness. The Court is not going to approve the property settlement." Plaintiff's counsel persisted, however, in showing that plaintiff earned her own living before the marriage and that she worked "for a while" subsequent to the separation, earning $155 per month.
The trial court, after completion of the testimony of the corroborating witness. inquired whether defendant's counsel was in the courtroom. Plaintiff's counsel replied that he did not think so but "I know we spent some time to get this property settlement. It has been after constant negotiation for two months." The trial judge replied that defendant should be advised to stipulate to an amendment of the agreement to provide that the $50 per month until further order of the court was for the support and maintenance of plaintiff as well as the child. "If he refuses to stipulate, serve him with an amended complaint in which that is requested in the prayer, and at that time this Court will make that order." Defendant refused to stipulate to the change and, about four months later, plaintiff's motion for leave to file an "Amendment to Complaint to Conform to Proof" was heard. This amendment added the words "of plaintiff and" to the prayer, thereby changing it to read, " ..• and then the sum of Fifty Dollars ($50) per month for the support and maintenance of plaintiff and of said minor son, Bryan George Adams." Defendant's counsel appeared specially to question the jurisdiction of the court to allow such an amendment, but the motion was granted. The amendment was served on defendant and he defaulted. The trial court approved the property settlement "except as to the limitation therein with reference to the payments of $50.00 per month," awarded eustod¥. of the ehild to plaintiff, and awarded support and
maintenance as requested in the amendment to the complaint. Plainti«, therefore, obtained permanent support although the agreement provided for her support for a period of 18 months only.
Defendant Contends that the property aettlement agree.. ment is valid and, in the absence of a finding that it is inequitable or was procured by fraud or compulson, should have been approved by the trial court. We agree with his contention.
[ [2] The most diftieult problems arising from such contracts are those concerning support and maintenance provisions when the agreement is presented to the court in a divorce action. The parties, upon separation, may agree to provide for support and maintenance in a variety of ways, which generally fall into three categories. The fuost includes contracts in which the support and maintenance provisions are in the nature of alimony, whether in lump sum or monthly payments, and are sep&'8ble from the provisions that divide the property. The contract may even provide solely for support and maintenance. without reference to a division of property. in a contract containing provisions for division of property and payments of "support and maintenance," whether the payments are part of the division of property or are in the nature of alimony. "It would be better practice to have that determination clearly and concisely made by the trial court when it renders the decree of divorce. Considerable confusion and uncertainty could be avoided in that fashion. The court could examine the agreement, the ciremnstanees under which it was made, and the nature and value of the property as related to itR division and the amount of the periodic payments giving consideration to the statutory rules on the subject." (Hqugh v. Hough, suprtJ, at p. 615; Puckett v. Puckett, suprtJ, at p. 841.)
[Gal The third category includes contraets in which the wife waives all support and maintenance, or all support and maintenance except as provided in the agreement, in eonsideration of receiving a more favorable division of the community property. The court cannot add a provision for alimony to such contraets without changing basiea11y the agreement of the parties as to the division of their property. We are confronted with such a aituation in the present ease.
.. [29 C.2d Plaintiif eontends that the trial eourt did not make a new property settlement agreement for the parties but approved the agreement except for the provision in which she waived all support and maintenance. The waiver, it is urged, is against public policy and the trial court properly exercised its discretion in awarding support and maintenance in the nature of alimony. She relies upon Moog v. Moog, 203 Cal. 406 [264 P. 490] , and Smith v. Smith, 94 Ca1.. App. 35 [270 P. 463] , to support this eontention. Moog v. Moog was concern:;d with a contract that had been made six years before the action for divorce, apparently without advice of counsel. The trial eourt ordered alimony as set out in the eontract, but the monthly payments were to begin at once despite the fact that the wife had already received installments in advance for 14 months. The contract contained no waiver and apparently dealt only with alimony. In view of the grossly inequitable character of the contract, owing to changed circumstances at the time of the trial, it was held that the trial eourt acted within its power in granting the wife additional alimony. In Smith v. Smith the wife executed a release of all her claims for community property and alimony in eonsideration of the husband'!'! dil!Illissal of an appeal taken by him from the judgment of divorce. It was there held, in affirming the order of the tria I court granting alimony, that the release was not before the trial court when it made its decree. Alternate grounds for the decision were that the release lacked consideration and that it was not a property settlement agreement. These two cases do not support plaintiif's contention. The contract before the trial court in the present case was clearly one that attempted to settle the property rights of the parties. It contained a waiver of all other payments in eonsideration of her receipt of the major portion of the community property. and that waiver was inseparable from the remainder of the division of property. A waiver under such conditions is not void per .e. (Ex parte Weiler, 106 Ca1.App. 485, 488 [289 P. 645] .) This court has often considered agreements conmining similar provisions without expressing disapproval of the waiver. (Puckett v. Puckett, 8'Upra,  Lee, 55 Mont. 426, 433 [178 P. 173 ]; see 1 Nelson on Divorce, § 13.44.) [6] It is true that public policy requires the protection of the wife and that in a divorce action the court in its discretion may award her necessary alimony. (Civ. Code § 139.) Such discretion, however, does not empower the trial eourt to modify valid agreements of the parties pertaining to the division of their property. The court cannot, 88 was attempted in the present ease, purport to approve the agreement and at the same time order payment of support and maintenance contrary to its terms.
[5b] Plaintiff now contends that the agreement did not actually award her the major part of the community property and, since she was not working at the time of the trial, the trial eourt acted within its discretion in awarding her alimony contrary to the agreement upon the disclosure of defendant's salary. Plaintiff, however, was content with the agreement at the time of the trial and presented no evidenee showing that it was unfair, nor was any such evidence elieited by the trial court. Her earning capacity had not been altered and the circumstances of the parties were substantially as they had envisaged them at the time they made the agreement. Further, the eourt did not set aside the agreement, upon proper showing of fraud, compulsion or inequity, nor was there a reconsideration of the apportionment of the community property. v. Eddy, 64 Cal.App.2d 672 [149 P.2d 187] . These cases were concerned with decrees granting alimony in default actions where there were no requests for alimony in the relief prayed for. In each case the relief was found to be in excess of that prayed for and the eourt stated that when the trial court finds that just.ice requires the payment of support money it should set aside the default and authorize [29 C.M the filing and service of an amended complaint containing appropriate allegatioDS and prayer for support money, after which it would be in a position to include any appropriate orders in its decree. That question is not before us in this ease. Although the court ordered plaintiff to amend her complaint to request permanent support and maintenance, the decree purported to approve the property settlement and ordered permanent support contrary to its term&. If the court coDSidered the agreement valid it should have given relief in accordance with ita terms. If, on the other hand, it had to be set aside upon any valid ground at the time of trial, it should not have been made a part of the judgment. (MaiM" v. MaiM", 70 Cal.App.2d 619, 626 [161 P.2d 494] .) Majon v. Majora, aupra, also relied upon by both parties, was concerned with a decree that arbitrarily refused to approve & property settlement agreement, and, at the same time, ordered permanent support contrary to the terms of the agreement. The judgment was reversed because the relief was in excess of that prayed for and the trial court was ordered to approve the agreement on the grounds that neither had objected to its terms and there was no showing of fraud or other invalidity. The mere order by the trial court in the present ease causing the complaint to be amended did not remove the incoDSisteney between the agreement and the decree, and the reasoning in the Majors ease on that point (MajM" v. MaiM", aupra, at 626) is in accord with the reasoning herein.
The rule that a wife may waive alimony in return for & more favorable division of the community property 80 long as the agreement was valid when made does not deprive her of the protection of the courts. A court in & divorce action will carefully scrutinize the agreements, especially where the parties did not have the advice of counsel. The wife, after being advised of her rights by her attorney, might not wish to sign the agreement; if not, she may request that provisions for alimony and the division of the property be made by the court in the divorce action. If her eonsent to the agreement was procured through fraud or eompul&ion, or if eireumstances are such that the court flnds the agreement inequitable, the court may withhold approval of the agreement. In the present ease the wife agreed to waive alimony and accept a major portion of the community property and payments for a period of 18 months. Since nothing was shown to indicate that the agreement was inequitable the parties are bound by the agreement. 
829
The judgment is therefore modified by ItrikiDg from the third paragraph thereof the following: ", except 88 to the limitation therein with reference to the payments of $50.00 per month".and by striking from the fifth paragraph thereof the following "of plaintiff and". As 80 modi1led the juc1plent is afBrmed.
Oibaoll. 0.1., Shenk, J., Edmonds. I. Carta; I. Schauer, J., aDd Spence, I., eoncurrecL ( ...
